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Does Growing Inequality Reduce Tax Progressivity?  Should It? 
Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija 
 
1. Introduction 
  Over at least the past two decades the average real income of the bottom four 
deciles has stagnated, while the real income of those at the top of the income distribution 
has grown sharply.  Income inequality has sharply increased. 
  During the same period, the progressivity of the tax-and-transfer system has not 
increased, and has arguably declined.  In the decade of the 1980’s the progressivity of the 
federal tax system first declined, and then increased, so that in 1990 it was not 
substantially different from what it was in 1980.
1  Arguably, the top rate increases of 
1990 and 1993 increased progressivity, but the expansion of capital gains tax preferences 
in 1997 and, possibly after, offset the higher top rates.  The generosity of transfers to the 
poor has declined, too. 
  This paper explores the links between these two phenomena.  We emphasize the 
causal link going from inequality to progressivity, noting that optimal taxation theory 
predicts the opposite of what has occurred -- that growing inequality should increase 
                                                 
1 The Congressional Budget Office has calculated a consistent series of tax distribution for about two 
decades. This series uses a definition of income somewhat broader than adjusted gross income, includes all 
federal taxes, and assumes that the burden of the corporate income tax falls on capital income generally.  
Under these assumptions, the average tax rate on the top 1 percent of income earners fell from 34.9 percent 
to 26.2 percent between 1980 and 1985, rose to 36.5 percent by 1995, and then fell slightly to 34.4. percent 
by 1999.  Average tax rates were changed very little between 1980 and 1999 for most of the rest of the 
income distribution.   The average rate on the second lowest quintile fell slightly from 15.0 percent to 13.7 
percent between 1980 and 1999.  In the middle quintile, the average rate edged down from 19.1 percent to 
18.9 percent.  In the second highest quintile, the average rate was 22.2 percent in both 1980 and 1999.  The 
rate for the top quintile went from 28.2 percent to 29.1 percent.  The bottom quintile did experience a 
substantial decline in average federal tax rates, from 7.7 percent to 4.6 percent, largely due to an increased 
personal exemption and standard deduction after 1986, and expansion of the earned income tax credit.  
However, this does not take into account reductions in transfers such as food stamps and welfare payments.  
The combined tax and transfer system is thus probably not much different in its progressivity in 1999 than 
it was in 1980.  Source: Kasten, Sammartino, and Toder (1994), and Congressional Budget Office (1998c).       2 
progressivity.  We discuss public choice alternatives to the optimal progressivity 
framework.  The paper also addresses the opposite causal direction -- that it is changes in 
taxation that have caused the (apparent) increase in inequality -- and also the possibility 
that the two phenomena are causally unrelated, but caused by a common set of exogenous 
factors. 
  In Section 6, we make two empirical contributions to this debate.  First, we argue 
that standard measures of income distribution ignore the implications of the large recent 
run-up in stock prices, and attempt a crude calculation of what this impact might be.  We 
calculate the distribution of income taking account of the stock market runup, and 
compare it to more standard measures that ignore it.  In addition, the effective tax rate on 
these gains is arguably quite low, reducing the progressivity of the tax system much 
below what standard measures suggest. Finally, we investigate the “non-event study” 
offered by the large changes in the distribution of income beginning in 1996, and discuss 
its implications for the issues addressed by this paper. 
 
2.  Should Increased Inequality Reduce Tax Progressivity? 
2.1  Optimal Progressivity Theory 
 
The modern theory of optimal progressivity accepts, for the sake of argument, the 
right of government to redistribute income through the tax system (and other means), 
sidesteps the ethical arguments about the value of a more equal distribution of economic 
outcomes, and instead investigates the implications of various value judgments and 
parameters of the economic system for the design of the tax system.  Front and center 
comes the fact that greater redistribution of income requires higher marginal tax rates, 
which may provide disincentives to work, save, take risks, and invest in human and   3 
physical capital.  The essential problem, then, is to describe the inherent tradeoffs 
between the distribution of income and economic performance. 
Mirrlees (1971) initiated the modern literature formalizing this tradeoff.  In his 
formulation, the government must choose an income tax schedule to raise a given amount 
of total revenue, with the goal of maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function.  This 
function implicitly trades off the welfare of individuals at different income levels, but 
assumes that social welfare increases when any member of society (including the richest) 
is better off, holding others’ welfare constant.  It therefore precludes envy as the basis of 
tax policy.
2  Mirrlees first investigated what characterizes the optimal income tax
3 for any 
set of assumptions about the social welfare function, the distribution of endowments, and 
the behavioral response (utility) functions.  He concluded that in this general case only 
very weak conditions characterize the optimal tax structure, conditions that offer little 
concrete guidance in the construction of a tax schedule. 
In the absence of general results, the approach has been to make specific 
assumptions about the key elements of the model, and then to calculate the parameters of 
the optimal income tax system.  This approach is meant to suggest the characteristics of 
the optimal income tax under reasonable assumptions and to investigate how these 
characteristics depend on the elements of the model.  Mirrlees also pioneered this 
approach in his 1971 article, and concluded that the optimal tax structure is 
approximately linear (that is, it has a constant marginal tax rate and an exemption level 
below which tax liability is negative) and has marginal tax rates which were quite low by 
then current standards, usually between 20 and 30 percent and almost always less than 40 
                                                 
2 Feldstein (1976) offers an excellent review of these issues. 
3 Because a tax schedule may feature rebates rather than taxes at some levels of income, it is really the 
optimal tax-and-transfer system that is at issue in the optimal progressivity literature.   4 
percent.
4  This was a stunning and unexpected result even, it seems, to Mirrlees himself, 
and especially in an era where top rates of 70 percent or more were the norm. 
Subsequent work investigated the sensitivity of the optimal income tax to the 
parametric assumptions.  Of particular interest to the topic at hand, Mirrlees presented an 
example in which widening the distribution of skills, assumed equal to wage rates, 
increased the optimal marginal tax rates, though he considered the dispersion of skills 
necessary to imply much higher rates to be unrealistic.  In his baseline numerical 
simulation he set the value of σ (the standard deviation of the associated normal 
distribution) in the assumed logarithmal distribution of skills to be equal to 0.39, derived 
from Lydall’s (1968) figures for the distribution of income from employment for various 
countries. When Mirrlees repeats the simulation with σ=1.0, a much wider dispersion of 
ability, he reports (p. 207) that the optimal tax schedule  
is in almost all respects very different.  Tax rates are very high:  a large  
proportion of the population is allowed to abstain from productive labour.   
The results seem to say that, in an economy with more intrinsic inequality  
in economic skill, the income tax is a more important weapon of public  
control than it is in an economy where the dispersion of innate skills is less.   
The reason is, presumably, that the labour-discouraging effects of the tax  
are more important, relative to the redistributive benefits, in the latter case.  
 
Stern (1976), examining only flat-rate tax systems, corroborates Mirrlees finding.  For his 
base case featuring an elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure of 0.4, when 
σ=0.39, the optimal marginal tax rate is 0.225, but it rises to 0.623 when σ=1.  Cooter 
and Helpman (1974) perform a variety of numerical simulations, and find that for all of 
                                                 
4 Note that, although the marginal tax rate is approximately constant, the average tax rate (tax liability 
divided by income) increases with income due to the presence of the positive exemption level.  Mirrlees 
assumed that the government needed to raise 20% of national income in taxes.   5 
them the optimal marginal tax rate increased as the constant-mean ability distribution 
spreads out.
5 
The dispersion of skills is not the only determining parameter.  Atkinson (1973) 
explored the effect of increasing the egalitarianism of the social welfare function.  Even 
in the extreme case of Rawls’ (1971) “maximin” social welfare function, where social  
welfare is judged solely on the basis of how well off the worst-off class of people is, the 
model generated optimal tax rates not much higher than 50 percent.  Stern (1976) argued 
that Mirrlees' assumption about the degree of labor supply responsiveness was excessive, 
and thereby overstated the costs of increasing tax progressivity.  This is true because the 
larger the responsiveness, the larger will be the social waste (in this case, people whose 
labor productivity exceeds their valuation of leisure, but do not work) per dollar of 
revenue raised.  Stern showed that when what he considered to be a more reasonable 
estimate of labor supply responsiveness is used (an elasticity of substitution of 0.4, 
instead of 1.0), the value of the optimal tax rate exceeds 50%, approximately twice as 
high as what Mirrlees found. 
In sum, simple models of optimal income taxation do not necessarily point to 
sharply progressive tax structures, even if the objective function puts relatively large 
weight on the welfare of less well-off individuals.  This conclusion does, though, depend 
critically on the sensitivity of labor supply to the after-tax wage rate and the subject of 
this paper, the distribution of endowments. 
                                                 
5 Helpman and Sadka (1978) claim that this result is not general, but offer only a trivial counter-example, 
with a Rawlsian (maximim) social welfare function and a fixed lowest ability level of zero.  They argue 
that there should be counter-examples with more general social welfare functions, but admit they were 
unable to identify such an example.   6 
The last point suggests an apparent inconsistency between the theory of optimal 
income taxation and actual U.S. income tax-and-transfer policy of the past two decades: 
the degree of progressivity has hardly budged, may have decreased, and certainly has not 
increased substantially in the face of apparently massive increases in the degree of pre-
tax income inequality.  There are many, not mutually exclusive, ways to reconcile this 
inconsistency.  It could be that the optimal progressivity models are not rich enough to 
give accurate predictions about appropriate tax-and-transfer policy.  It could be that other 
changes in the U.S. economy, either unrelated to the increasing inequality or structurally 
related but distinct from it, can explain the policy response.  Finally, it could be that the 
political system produces outcomes in a way that is unrelated, or even opposite, from 
what would be predicted by the artificial construct of constrained social welfare 
maximization.  In what follows we consider further each of these possible explanations of 
the inconsistency between the theory and practice of income tax progressivity.  We begin 
by looking more closely at the models of optimal progressivity. 
 
2.2  “Richer” Models of Optimal Tax Progressivity 
In the standard formulation of the optimal progressivity problem, the rich are 
different from the poor in only one way:  they are endowed with the ability to command a 
higher market wage rate, which is presumed to reflect a higher real productivity of their 
labor effort.  In fact there is a variety of other reasons why some people end up affluent 
and others do not, with vastly different policy implications. 
The rich may have been lucky.  The influential study of Jencks et al (1972) 
concluded that, in addition to on-the-job competence, economic success depended   7 
primarily on luck,
6 but that “those who are lucky tend, of course, to impute their success 
to skill, while those who are inept believe that they are merely unlucky.”
7  (p. 227) 
If there is income uncertainty which is uncorrelated across individuals and for 
which private insurance markets do not exist, then taxation becomes a form of social 
insurance; a more progressive system, by narrowing the dispersion in after-tax income, 
provides more social insurance than a less progressive tax system.  The optimally 
progressive tax system then balances the gains from social insurance (and perhaps also 
redistribution) against the incentive costs.  Varian (1980) argued that, in the presence of 
substantial uncertainty/luck, the optimal marginal tax rate should in all likelihood be 
high, because high realized income is probably due to a good draw of the random 
component of income, and taxing an event probably largely due to luck will have 
minimal disincentive effects. 
The rich may have different tastes, either for goods compared to leisure (working 
harder), or for future consumption.  In the former case, even with homogenous wage 
rates, some people will have higher incomes by virtue of working more, but the higher 
income is offset by less leisure time.  In this case a progressive tax system is not 
necessarily redistributing from the better off to the worse off, but capriciously according 
to tastes.  Sandmo (1993) investigates the model with heterogeneous tastes, but offers no 
unambiguous conclusions about optimal progressivity. 
The rich may have inherited more, either in terms of financial resources or in 
terms of human capital.  If inherited endowment is the principal source of inequality (so 
that, inter alia, people do not differ in what they make of their endowments), from a one-
                                                 
6 The authors of this study admit, though, that their conclusions do not apply to the “very rich,” defined as 
those with assets exceeding $10 million (of 1972 dollars). 
7 Thurow (1975) offers a similar view.   8 
generation perspective there is little potential economic cost from a tax system that 
redistributes the fruits of this endowment.  A longer horizon is required, however, 
because the incentive of parents to leave an endowment would arguably be affected by 
such taxation, and so could affect the incentive of potential bequeathors to work and to 
save. 
The rich may have different skills than everyone else, rather than more of the 
same kind of skills.  This characterization certainly rings true, as the affluent tend to 
supply “skilled” rather than “unskilled” labor, i.e., entrepreneurs, professionals, or 
“symbolic analysts” in Reich’s (1991) terminology. 
Why does this matter for optimal progressivity?  For one thing, as Feldstein 
(1973) first investigated, when there are two distinct types of labor the relative wage rate 
will depend on the relative supply to the market of the two kinds of labor, which in turn 
depends on the tax system chosen.  Thus, the tax system redistributes income directly 
through differential tax liabilities, but also indirectly by altering the wage structure.  
Although Feldstein argued that this did not substantially alter optimal progressivity, Allen 
(1982) disagreed, arguing that it could be important enough that an increase in the 
statutory progressivity of an income tax system could actually make members of the 
lower-ability, lower-income group worse off, because it reduces their before-tax wage 
rate. 
But what if the affluent offer to the economy a particularly essential ingredient?  
Gilder (1990, p. 245) certainly thinks so, arguing that “a successful economy depends on 
the proliferation of the rich, on creating a large class of risk-taking men [sic] who are 
willing to shun the easy channels of a comfortable life in order to create new 
enterprise…”  If entrepreneurial talent is priced appropriately by the market, then the   9 
standard optimal progressivity framework still applies:  the extent that taxes discourage 
its supply is a social cost.  But there may be more to it than this if there are important 
spillovers of information from entrepreneurial activity whose social value cannot be 
captured by the entrepreneurs themselves.  In economics jargon, there are positive 
externalities of innovation.  These kinds of externalities are the building blocks of many 
“new growth” theories, propounded by Romer (1990) among others, who argue that 
policy can have persistent effects on economic growth rates, not just on the level of 
economic performance.  Gilder appears to believe this, asserting that “most successful 
entrepreneurs contribute far more to society than they ever recover, and most of them win 
no riches at all”  (p. 245). 
To the extent that the activities of the affluent have positive externalities because 
of their entrepreneurial nature, this argues for lower taxation at the top than otherwise.  
But the argument is not crystal clear.  Although it is true that, compared to the overall 
population, a larger fraction of the rich classify themselves as professional or managerial 
(48.5% versus 27% in 1982, according to Slemrod, 1994), it is also true that a larger than 
average fraction (12% versus 1%) are lawyers and accountants, professions that some 
have argued are detrimental to economic growth, because they are concerned with rent-
seeking rather than income creation.  Magee, Brock, and Young (1989) present evidence 
that countries with more lawyers grow more slowly. 
 
2.4  The Reason Behind Increased Inequality and Why it Matters for Optimal 
Progressivity 
 
  This discussion suggests that the cause of the increased inequality matters in 
determining the appropriate policy response.  Alas, no one knows for sure why the 
dispersion of pre-tax incomes has surged.  Changing inheritance patterns or tastes are   10 
unlikely to be important and, as we discuss in Section 4, the weight of the evidence 
suggests that labor supply changes are not a major factor, either. 
  That leaves a change in the relative return to skills and luck as the two relevant 
factors to consider.  The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive factors.  After all, the 
widening dispersion of the return to skills -- often summarized as the return to education  
-- was not completely anticipated, and so to some extent the extraordinary recent earnings 
of those endowed with the right skill type is just a good draw.  If so, the taxation of these 
earnings will have a relatively small efficiency effect.  Of course, looking forward any 
such tax will have an (inefficient) impact on skill acquisition decisions.  In any event, a 
progressive tax system does provide some degree of social insurance against uncertainty 
in the distribution of the return to skill, whether caused by unpredictable technological 
advances or developments in the global economy.  We return to this issue in Section 5, 
when we discuss the implications of globalization. 
 
3.  Does Increased Inequality Reduce Progressivity?  The Public Choice Perspective 
 
  Up to this point we have addressed the appropriate, or optimal, degree of 
progressivity, given a specified social objective function and a characterization of how 
the economy works.  In this section we put aside this normative question and focus on a 
public choice question:  given the political institutions and social choice mechanisms in 
the U.S., does an increase in inequality trigger the kinds of policy changes that would 
increase progressivity? 
    According to the standard theory of optimal progressivity, a more disperse wage 
distribution should increase the amount of redistribution because it increases the weight 
placed on the equity gain from redistribution relative to the efficiency losses.  This is also   11 
the prediction of the "rational" (public choice) theory of the size of government proposed 
by Meltzer and Richard (1981), in which increased inequality increases mean income 
relative to the income of the decisive voter, and thus makes redistribution more attractive 
to him or her.  Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) incorporate 
versions of this result in constructing models of why greater pre-tax-and-transfer 
inequality is bad for economic growth.   
    Peltzman (1980), stimulated by his observation that in practice greater inequality 
seemed to lead to less redistribution, constructed a model in which the total support for 
redistribution increases if income differences among beneficiaries narrow.  Because 
inequality tends to increase both within-group and between-group inequality, its net 
effect on redistribution is indeterminate.  Kristov, Lindert, McClelland (1992) develop a 
pressure-group model of individuals with "social affinity" (i.e., in which people care 
more about the well-being of people like themselves), which predicts that progressive 
redistribution is fostered by greater proximity and inter-mobility between the middle and 
poorest income ranks, and reduced by greater proximity and inter-mobility between the 
middle and top income ranks.  They also suggest that economic growth affects the 
political will to provide income support for the poorest:  depressions awake sympathy for 
persons with low income and reinforce the return that poverty arises because of bad luck.  
Lindert (1996) explains this “Robin Hood paradox” as occurring because greater 
inequality between lower and middle-income classes means less commonality of identity, 
weakening the inclination of middle-class voters to redistribute toward lower-income 
families.  
    In sum, models of public choice do not speak with one voice as to how policy will 
actually respond to an increased dispersion of earnings.  Empirical investigation has not   12 
yet succeeded in identifying which set of conceptual models best captures the key 
features of the U.S. political system with regard to fiscal progressivity. 
 
4.  Did Tax Changes Cause the Increased Inequality? 
    Maybe it works the other way around.  Maybe it is changes in the tax system 
which have driven the increase in inequality.  The reduced tax rates on high-income 
families may have induced them to expend more effort, which increases measured 
incomes (as opposed to income net of the value of foregone leisure).  The reduced tax 
rates may also have caused a whole host of other behavioral responses, ranging from 
substitution away from tax-preferred activities such as charitable contributions, 
investment in tax-exempt bonds, and receiving compensation as fringe benefits to less 
investment in tax avoidance strategies, to less tax evasion.  The labor supply response to 
increased progressivity would show up as increased inequality of labor income, and all of 
the responses would show up as increased inequality of taxable incomes. 
  There is now a sizable empirical literature trying to measure the magnitude of 
these responses.  With some exceptions, the profession has settled on a value for the 
compensated labor supply elasticity close to zero for prime-age males, although for 
married women the responsiveness of labor force participation appears to be significant.  
Overall, though, the compensated elasticity of labor appears to be fairly small.  In models 
with only a labor-leisure choice, this implies that the efficiency cost of income taxation is 
bound to be low, as well.   
  There is intriguing evidence that the response to taxes of total reported income 
may not be small, at least for high-income families.  Lindsey (1987) was one of the first 
to point out that the 1981 top rate cut in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, or   13 
ERTA, from 70% to 50% coincided with a very large increase in the share of income 
reported to the IRS by the top 1% of the income distribution.  He argues that the tax cut 
was a principal cause of this increase, as it reduced the penalty for receiving (or, to be 
precise, reporting) taxable income, and estimates the elasticity of taxable income with 
respect to the net-of-tax share to be between 1.6 and 1.8. 
Feenberg and Poterba (1993) use tax return data to calculate a time series of 
inequality measures that focuses on high-income households.  Using interpolations of 
published SOI aggregated data, they calculate the share of adjusted gross income (AGI) 
and several components of AGI that were received by the top 0.5% of households 
arranged by income.  After being approximately flat at about 6.0% from 1970 to 1981, it 
begins in 1982 to increase continuously to 7.7% in 1985, then jumps sharply in 1986 to 
9.2%.  There is a slight increase in 1987 to 9.5%, then another sharp increase in 1988 to 
12.1%.  
Feenberg and Poterba argue that this pattern is consistent with a behavioral 
response to the reductions over this period in the tax rate on high-income families.  They 
also report that among the top income earners, the largest increase in share could be 
attributed to the top one-fifth of one percent.  This fact, they assert, “casts doubt on the 
view that the factors responsible for the increase in reported incomes among high-income 
taxpayers, especially in the 1986-1988 period, are the same factors that were responsible 
for the widening of the wage distribution over a longer time period.” (p. 161)  Rather, 
they argue, “it reflect[s] other factors including a tax-induced change in the incentives 
that high-income households face for reporting taxable income.” (p. 170). 
It is well known that there are serious problems with comparing cross-sectional 
slices of income distributions, because it entails comparing different groups of   14 
households across years.  The potential hazards of inferring behavioral response from 
comparing the behavior of two distinct groups of taxpayers can be mitigated by analyzing 
longitudinal, or panel, data on an unchanging set of taxpayers.  Thus, analysis of panel 
data characterized the next wave of investigations of the taxable income elasticity. 
Feldstein (1995a) investigates the high-income response to the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (TRA86) using tax return panel data that follows the same set of taxpayers from 
1979 to 1988.  Feldstein analyzes married couples for whom both 1985 and 1988 tax 
returns were available.  He groups taxpayers by their 1985 marginal tax rate, calculates 
group means for taxable income and the net-of-tax rate for each group, and then 
calculates the percentage change in the mean between the years, using the difference in 
the difference of these percentages to obtain elasticities.  After making several 
adjustments to the data, he concludes that the 1985-1988 percentage increase in various 
measures of income (particularly taxable income excluding capital gains) was much 
higher, compared with the rest of the population, for those high-income groups whose 
marginal tax rate was reduced the most.  Based on this finding, he estimates that the 
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate is very high, between 1 and 
3 in alternative specifications.  To put this into perspective, an elasticity greater than 
t
) t 1 ( −
, where t is the tax rate, will produce a Laffer-type inverse revenue response; thus, 
the upper-end range of Feldstein’s estimates suggests the possibility that tax increases 
would decrease revenue collected. 
Unfortunately, Feldstein’s data set contained only a very small number of high-
income observations; for example, the top income class on which Feldstein focuses most 
of his attention (non-elderly couples in the 49 to 50 percent tax brackets in 1985) contains 
only 57 observations.  Because of the wide variation among this group in financial   15 
situation and in income changes over time, generalizing from such a small sample is 
problematic. 
Auten and Carroll (1998) make use of a much larger longitudinal data set, 
consisting of 14,102 tax returns for the same set of taxpayers for 1985 and 1989.  The 
sample observations are stratified, so that high-income taxpayers are over-sampled, 
resulting in 4,387 taxpayers in the 49% or 50% tax rate bracket in 1985.  Rather than rely 
on group means, they employ a multivariate regression approach, regressing the change 
in AGI between 1985 and 1989 against the change in marginal tax rate and a set of 
demographic variables.  The regression approach allows them to control for occupation 
as a proxy for demand-side, non-tax factors that affected the change in compensation 
over this period.  They conclude that changes in tax rates appear to be an important 
determinant of the income growth of the late 1980’s, although the results are somewhat 
sensitive to the choice of sample and weighting.  Their central estimate of the net-of-tax 
price elasticity is 0.6. 
Moffitt and Wilhelm (1998) also investigate behavioral response to TRA86, but 
they make use of panel data from the 1983 and 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances.  
Because of data limitations, they study an  income concept closer to AGI than to taxable 
income.  They replicate the sizable tax elasticities for AGI found by Feldstein, and 
conclude that the elasticities arise from the behavior of the extreme upper tail of the 
income distribution. 
  All of the studies discussed so far focused on the effect of ERTA or TRA86 on 
taxpayer behavior.  For reasons elaborated on below, study of tax changes which 
increased tax rates would be especially helpful.  Carroll (1998a) uses a panel of taxpayers 
spanning the tax increases of the 1990 and 1993 Acts to consider to what extent taxpayers   16 
change their reported incomes in response to changes in tax rates.  The tax rate response 
is identified by comparing the change of higher income taxpayers to those of moderate 
income taxpayers in the face of the change in the relative taxation of these two groups, 
controlling for many non-tax factors such as the taxpayer’s age, occupation, and industry.  
Carroll concludes that the taxable income price elasticity is approximately 0.4, smaller 
than the earlier studies of the tax reductions in the 1980’s, but nevertheless a response 
that is positive and significantly different from zero. 
  There are a number of methodological problems with measuring and interpreting 
taxable income elasticities, which are discussed at length in Slemrod (1998a).  A key 
issue is the difficulty of controlling for underlying trends in income inequality that are 
unrelated to the tax changes.  In both ERTA and TRA86 the largest rate cuts applied to 
the highest tax brackets, so that a positive taxable income elasticity implied larger 
increases in reported taxable income among affluent Americans, and thus an increase in 
the apparent inequality of income.  One obvious methodological problem is to separate 
out the influence of the tax changes from non-tax factors affecting the steadily increasing 
dispersion of (taxable) income.  A voluminous literature (much of it summarized in Levy 
and Murnane (1992)) has documented an increase in inequality in the U.S..  Karoly 
(1994) presents Census Bureau data showing that inequality among families, after 
reaching a post-war low in 1967-68, began to increase during the 1970s and continued to 
rise through the 1980s.  Although the trend toward greater inequality began in the late 
1960s, about two-thirds of the increase in the Gini coefficient between 1968 and 1989 
occurred between 1980 and 1989.  Although these basic facts are now widely 
acknowledged, the origin of the increase in inequality remains highly controversial.  The 
two leading explanations, which are not mutually exclusive, are technological change that   17 
increased the relative return to skilled labor, and increased globalization of the U.S. 
economy, which increased the effective relative supply of unskilled labor and thereby 
lowered its relative return.  
  For the most part, what we know about this phenomenon comes from data sets 
that are either top-coded or include few of the highest-income families, so that the 
evidence is generally about the growing percentage differential in the earnings of  people 
at, say, the tenth percentile compared to the ninetieth percentile.  However, tax return 
data is neither top-coded and in fact oversamples high-income people, and it suggests a 
similar trend since 1970.  As discussed earlier, Feenberg and Poterba (1993) document 
that the share of income reported by the top 0.5% of the population increased slowly but 
steadily beginning in 1970, accelerated around 1980, and shot up in 1986.  They contend 
that this trend is consistent with the pattern of declining effective tax rates on affluent 
Americans that began in 1970 and picked up steam with the rate cuts of 1981 and 1986.  
Indeed, the top individual marginal tax rate has been monotonically declining since the 
early 1960s, so there is an a priori case that tax changes are a factor in the growing 
inequality. 
  Slemrod (1996) attempts to separate out the tax and non-tax causes of inequality 
by performing some time-series regression analyses of the Feenberg and Poterba high-
income shares for 1954 to 1990, with the data for the post-1986 years adjusted to 
correspond to a pre-TRA86 definition.  (This adjustment reduces the measured increase 
in the shares after 1986, but the increase remains substantial.)  Included as explanatory 
variables are the contemporaneous, lagged, and leading tax rate measures, a measure of 
earning inequality between the 90
th and 10
th percentiles, and some macroeconomic 
variables that might differentially influence incomes at different percentiles.  Based on   18 
the evidence up to 1985, the “demand-side,” earnings inequality variable is the dominant 
explanation.  However, the regression using data up to 1990 assigns almost all the 
increase in the high-income share of AGI to be associated with the decline in the top tax 
rate on wage income.  These findings imply one of two things: (i) that in the mid-1980s 
there was a break in the relationship between the non-tax factors affected the top 0.5% of 
the population and the factors affecting earnings dispersion more generally, or (ii) that the 
increase in the taxable income of the high-income families was primarily tax-driven.  I 
suspect that the second explanation applies, although Fullerton (1996) argues that, 
because TRA86 involved extensive tax definition as well as rate changes, it is difficult to 
confidently conclude that the change in rates was the critical factor. 
  Another post-TRA86 empirical strategy was to pray for tax increases on the rich, 
in the hope that whatever biases were creeping into estimates of the taxable income 
elasticity based on the 1981 and 1986 tax cut experience would be offset in analyses of 
tax increases.  Of course, these prayers were answered in the tax increases of 1990 and 
1993, and Carroll (1998a) has emphasized the possibility that his lower estimates of the 
taxable income elasticity are at least partly due to this offsetting bias.   
  Another empirical strategy used by both Auten and Carroll (1998) and Carroll 
(1998a) is to include variables that measure the non-tax factors that might have 
differentially affected income growth over the period spanning the tax change.  Dummy 
variables for Census regions are an uncontroversial example.  More problematic is the 
use of dummy variables for occupation.  The idea is that a differing occupational mix 
may explain why a given income group may have experienced a different percentage 
change in taxable income.  As Auten and Carroll discuss, this is a sensible strategy to the 
extent that the dummy variables account for relative increases in labor productivity due to   19 
technological advances or higher demand due to more global integration.  However, to 
the extent that they reflect differences in the flexibility to alter work schedules or 
compensation arrangements in response to tax rate changes (i.e., different elasticities), 
inclusion of these variables may bias downward the estimated elasticity.  This problem 
could be avoided by replacing the occupational dummies with independent estimates of 
wage rate growth for the taxpayer’s occupational category; this would restrict the 
explanatory power of occupation to demand-side factors. 
  Goolsbee (1998) notes that the analyses of both the 1981 and 1986 tax cuts look 
across samples where the stock market increased dramatically, corporate profits rose and 
GDP growth increased, and that these factors are associated with relative increases in the 
compensation of top executives, holding tax influences constant. 
  In sum, there is now a considerable body of evidence which supports the notion 
that the changes in the pattern of marginal tax rates did induce behavioral responses 
which would make the distribution of reported taxable incomes more unequal.  To the 
extent that this is true, the increased inequality of taxable incomes overstates the growth 
in inequality of welfare, because much of it is a substitution away from untaxed and 
generally unmeasured welfare-producing activities by those who formerly had much 
higher marginal tax rates.  However, the extent of these induced behavioral responses 
remains controversial.  Especially in light of new developments discussed in Section 6.2, 
it is highly unlikely that tax changes are responsible for all or most of the observed 
increased inequality of income. 
 
 
   20 
5.  Changing Third Factors 
    The correlation between changing inequality and progressivity might, of course, 
be purely coincidental.
8  That assertion is unproveable.  A more interesting (and 
falsifiable) possibility is that both trends are caused by the same third factor.  An 
intriguing candidate for this factor is the increasing globalization of national economies.  
That globalization is an important cause of the increased inequality in the U.S. and other 
industrialized countries is taken quite seriously, although it is highly controversial; we 
have nothing to add to this debate.  Instead, we are interested in its implications.  Suppose  
that globalization is at least partly responsible for the growth in inequality:  can it also 
explain the flight from progressivity? 
    For this question, the prediction of optimal taxation models is fairly clear:  absent 
the ability of national or supernational governments to tax individuals on a worldwide 
basis, openness increases the cost of government and of progressivity, because it 
increases the elasticity of taxed activities.  In particular, capital has more alternatives than 
to locate within a country's own borders, people have more opportunities to purchase 
goods outside their country of residence, and some firms and groups of people have 
increasing flexibility about what their country of residence is.  The higher the elasticity of 
taxed activities, the greater is the social cost per dollar raised. 
    If countries react to the increasing cost of government that globalization causes, 
then the size of government and the extent of progressivity should be shrinking.  Thus, in 
principle, globalization could explain both the trend increase in inequality and the decline  
                                                 
8 For example, the declining progressivity might simply be due to declining aversion to inequality, at least 
as expressed through the political system.   21 
in progressivity.  The problem is that this line of reasoning flies in the face of empirical 
studies that claim that, across countries and across time within countries, greater 
openness has led to larger, not smaller, governments.  This relationship was first 
discovered by Cameron (1978), who found that openness, measured as exports and 
imports of goods and services as a percent of GDP in 1960, was the best single predictor 
of the growth of public revenues relative to output from 1960 to 1970 for 18 OECD 
nations.  Rodrik (1997) has updated this finding, with a 100-plus country sample, 
establishing a strong and robust association between an economy’s exposure to trade and 
the size of its government in both cross-sectional and longitudinal settings.
9  This had  
been predicted by Myrdal (1960, p. 702), who argued that “all states have felt compelled 
to undertake new radical intervention” in response to more chaotic economic relations 
following openness, and Lindbeck (1995, p. 56), who observed that overt social insurance 
and tax systems represent built-in stabilizers that maintain full employment in spite of the 
uncertainties of demand inherent in an open economy.   
    Thus, it may be that globalization increases both the cost and the benefits of (at 
least some kinds of) government:  both the supply and demand curves shift upwards.  
Interpreting progressivity as one aspect of government, this implies that the change in 
progressivity is indeterminate, but the price of progressivity certainly increases.  Some of 
this cost increase will occur because tax revenues are more difficult to raise in a world of 
mobile tax bases, but some of it will be because citizens are more willing to tolerate a 
costly social insurance in a world that is vulnerable to economic forces generating 
uncertainty and inequality.  The consequence for progressivity is thus not entirely clear. 
                                                 
9 Although note that Lindert (1996) argues that openness fails to explain patterns of social spending for 
OECD countries from 1960 to 1981.   22 
    The leading alternative to globalization as an explanation for growing inequality 
is skill-biased technological change.  What is its impact on taxation?  On the tax 
collection side, it has facilitated computer checks of tax returns against information 
reports provided to the IRS by employers, banks, and other financial institutions, 
lowering the cost of collecting revenue in an equitable way.  On the other hand, the 
growth of electronic commerce and diffusion of sophisticated financial instruments has 
also undoubtedly facilitated certain kinds of tax avoidance.  In principle, technological 
change could be a third factor affecting both inequality and progressivity, but we are a 
long way from having any quantitative understanding of this relationship. 
 
6.  Two Recent Developments 
  Two recent developments shed some fascinating new light on the growth in 
inequality and its relationship to the tax system. 
 
6.1  The Impact of the Stock Market Runup on Inequality and Progressivity 
Between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 1997, broad-based indices of the 
stock market more than doubled.  Accounting for this phenomenon certainly increases the 
measured inequality of income, in particular the share of total income received by the top, 
say, 1% of families ranked by income.  Depending on the incidence assumptions one 
makes, it can also sharply decrease the measured degree of tax progressivity. 
The impact of this extraordinary burst of accrued income is illustrated in Table 1, 
which shows the results of three alternative methodologies for computing the distribution 
of income.  All three are based on the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, which 
includes detailed income and wealth information for 4,299 households.  The sample is   23 
stratified, with a heavy over-sampling of high-income and high-wealth households.  A 
non-response-adjusted weight provided by the SCF is used to make the results nationally 
representative.
10   
Three different definitions of income are used to illustrate the distribution of 
income in the U.S, each corresponding to an alternative assumption about the income 
derived from the ownership of corporate equities.  The first definition, what we call "self-
reported income," is the answer to:  "how much was the total income you received in 
1994 from all sources, before taxes and other deductions were made?"  This is generally 
equal to the sum of answers to questions about the various components of income, which 
treat capital income on a nominal, realization basis.  For instance, the survey asks about 
capital gains from sales of assets such as stocks and real estate, but does not ask about 
accrued capital gains on assets that were not sold during the year. 
We also construct two other income definitions to approximate an accrual-based 
measure of income, under two different assumptions about the rate of return to corporate 
equity.  For each definition we replace reported realized nominal capital income (except 
for closely-held business income) with imputed accrued capital income.  The capital 
income imputations are derived by applying uniform real rates of return to publicly-
traded corporate equities and non-business net worth.  All other income items are 
included as reported.  These include wages and salaries; income from a closely-held 
professional practice, business, or farm; pension income; social security income; 
unemployment insurance benefits; public assistance such as AFDC, food stamps, and 
SSI; and other miscellaneous forms of income such as gains from gambling.  Reported 
                                                 
10 In the case of missing or incomplete answers to certain questions, SCF imputes answers based on other 
information in the survey.  Several different "replicates" of the data are included in the SCF, each 
representing a different set of imputations.  We use the first replicate.   24 
dividends, realized capital gains, interest income, and rent, trust, royalty income are all 
excluded from income, and replaced with imputed measures of capital income.  No 
attempt is made to replace reported income from closely-held businesses with an imputed 
measure based on accrued capital income, because closely-held business income cannot 
be reliably divided into returns to labor and capital in the data.  The real rate of return to 
non-business net worth is assumed to be 3 percent, which is the rate used by the Treasury 
Department's Office of Tax Analysis for interest-bearing assets and debts in its 
distributional tables (Cilke et al,1994, pp. 3-26). 
For our first alternative definition, the real rate of return to publicly-traded 
corporate equities is assumed to be 6.4 percent, which is intended to approximate the rate 
of return implied by corporate earnings in 1995.  The 6.4% figure was calculated by 
dividing the National Income and Product Accounts measure of corporate profits after 
inventory valuation, capital consumption adjustment, and profits taxes for 1995, $371.8 
billion (August 1998 Survey of Current Business Table 1.16), by total corporate equity 
holdings in the 1995 SCF, $5.85 trillion.  The $5.85 trillion denominator includes all C- 
and S-corporation equity held either directly or through IRA, Keogh, or defined 
contribution pension accounts.  For the second alternative definition, we use a rate of 
return to publicly-traded corporate equities of 28 percent.  This is the annualized total real 
rate of return on the S&P 500 index between December 1994 and December 1997, with 
monthly reinvestment of dividends (Economic Report of the President, 1996, 1997, and 
1998).  The CPI-U is used to deflate the total S&P 500 return to a real rate of return.  Our 
measure of publicly-traded corporate equities includes both equities held directly, and   25 
those held in IRA, Keogh, and defined-contribution pension accounts (such as 401(k)s).
11 
Table A-1 in the appendix shows the distribution of net worth and equity holdings, by the 
alternative definitions of income. 
  Table 1 shows the results of this exercise.  Comparing the columns labeled "self-
reported income" with those labeled "income definition (1)" reveals that replacing 
realized corporate-source income with a constant 6.4 percent accrual rate of return does 
not materially affect the estimated distribution of income.  Also shown for comparison 
purposes is the income distribution under the Treasury Department's "family economic 
income" concept, which follows a similar approach to our "income definition (1)," but 
makes more detailed imputations using a variety data sources, including tax return data.  
The distribution of income in the Treasury calculations is also quite similar to that found 
in the SCF under either "self-reported" income or "income definition (1)."  However, as 
the columns labeled "income definition (2)" indicate, using the actual 1995-7 rate of 
return to publicly-traded equities of 28 percent causes dramatic changes.  Relative to 
"income definition (1)", the share of income received by the top 1% of the weighted 
sample goes from 14.3% to 17.8%, an increase of almost one-fourth; the share of the 95-
99
th percentile group increases by about one-sixth, from 14.6% to 17.0%.  Conversely, 
when the actual accrual rate of return is imputed to be 28%, the share of the bottom 
                                                 
11 For the retirement accounts, the SCF does not provide exact information on the share of the account held 
in each type of asset, but does ask what combinations of assets are held in the accounts.  Respondents who 
reported investing their IRA and Keogh accounts “mostly in stocks or mutual funds” are assumed to keep 
100% of their IRA or Keogh assets in corporate equities.  Those who report investing their IRA or Keoghs 
in a combination of stocks and bonds, a combination of stocks and interest-bearing accounts, or in a 
brokerage or cash management account, are assumed to keep 50% of their IRA or Keogh assets in equities.  
Those who report a combination of stocks, bonds, and interest-bearing accounts are assumed to keep 33% 
of their IRA or Keogh assets in equities.  For defined contribution accounts, respondents who report that 
the account is “mostly or all stock” are assumed to have 100% of their defined contribution pension assets 
in equities.  Those who report keeping a “split between stock and interest earning assets” are assumed to 
have 50% of their defined contribution assets in equities.  Only very limited information on defined benefit 
pension plans is available in the 1995 SCF, so these plans are excluded from all measures of net worth and 
equity holdings.   26 
quintile falls from 2.7% to 2.2%, and that of the second lowest quintile declines from 
7.9% to 6.7%. 
  We do not mean to imply that the rate of accrued capital gain during this period is 
likely to persist, making the more dispersed income distribution a steady state.  But 
neither should it be ignored, as it represents a very large amount of income that is, in 
spite of the recent diffusion of stock ownership, highly skewed.  Ranked by income 
definition (2), households in the top percentile of the income distribution owned $1.5 
million in publicly-traded corporate equities, on average, in 1995.  At an annual real rate 
of return of 28 percent, these households received an extra $1.2 million in income, on 
average, over the course of three years due to the stock market boom.
12      
  Depending on what tax burden one attributes to the income accrued by 
shareholders from 1995 to 1997, the runup also may have had a substantial impact on the 
progressivity of the tax system.  If one attributes to this income only an accrual-
equivalent capital gains tax, arguably only about 5% once one accounts for the benefit of 
deferral and the carryover of basis at death, the effective progressivity is much lower than 
official estimates would suggest. 
If, though, the stock market runup is due to an increased expected present value of 
corporate earnings, then this would normally be accompanied by a concomitant increase 
in corporate tax payments, so that the effective tax rate on this income is the average 
corporate tax rate plus any additional tax due at the individual level on dividends and 
capital gains.  If one attributes this tax in proportion to either the owners of corporate  
                                                 
12 Appendix Table A.1 shows equity holdings and net worth by income class.  The $1.2 million figure is 
calculated as ((1 + (.28 - .064))
3 x (1.5 million)) - 1.5 million.   27 
equity or, as is standard in incidence analysis, to the owners of all wealth, then the 
estimated progressivity would not be substantially altered. 
6.2  The "Taxpayer Didn't Notice" Act of 1995, and the 1996 and 1997 Surge in 
Inequality:  A Non-Event Study 
 
Most of the recent evidence concerning how taxes affect taxpayer choices as 
reflected in reported taxable income comes from analyses of the 1981, 1986, 1990, and 
1993 tax changes.  The first two lowered the top marginal tax rate, and the latter two 
increased it.  Because one of the most difficult empirical tasks is to separate out the effect 
of the tax changes from non-tax-related trends in income inequality, the fact that the latter 
two tax changes increased rather than decreased rates is helpful. 
It is also insightful to analyze trends in income inequality over periods when there 
is no important tax change.  One fascinating period began in 1996, immediately after the 
passage of an exceptionally uneventful tax bill of 1995, which among things, did not 
change the tax rate structure.  This non-event was soon followed by some striking 
developments. 
The first sign that something extraordinary was happening was the unexpected 
surge in federal individual income tax revenues.  Individual income tax receipts for fiscal 
year 1997 turned out to be $61 billion, or about 9%, higher than the Congressional 
Budget Office had estimated in January of 1997.
13  About half of this increase was due to 
capital gains realizations.  Roughly $20 billion was due to an unexpectedly high level of 
capital gains reported on returns for tax year 1996.  Another $14 billion represented 
unexpectedly high estimated tax payments for 1997, much of which also probably was 
due to capital gains.  Total capital gains realizations increased by 45% between 1995 and  
                                                 
13 This episode is described in Congressional Budget Office (1998a).   28 
1996, and preliminary estimates suggested another 45% increase in 1997.  
Although the higher 1997 estimated tax payments may have partly reflected a response to 
the capital gains rate cut implemented on May 7, 1997, the 1996 realizations would have 
been expected to be lower due to anticipation of the following year's rate cut.  Another 
factor was the increasing share of income reported by higher-income, and therefore 
higher marginal tax rate, individuals.  The CBO calculates that the effective income tax 
rate (total income taxes paid divided by total adjusted gross income) increased from 
13.7% to 14.0% from 1994 to 1995, and to 14.6% in 1996.  Taxpayers with income of 
$200,000 or more (in 1996 dollars) accounted for 17% of total AGI in 1996, up from 
16% in 1995 and 14% in 1994.  In a July, 1998 report, the CBO (1998b) discusses that 
actual revenues for 1998 were also running higher than anticipated, but did not yet have 
enough information to discuss what its sources were. 
In its January, 1998 report the CBO speculated that another component of the 
surge of incomes at the top is bonuses and stock options.  Rapid growth in both stock 
prices and grants of employee stock options have caused the taxable value of exercised 
options to increase dramatically.  The CBO refers to data which suggest that the taxable 
value of exercised options doubled in 1995, doubled again in 1996, and continued to 
grow rapidly in 1997. 
Carroll (1998b) documents that the share of total income reported by taxpayers 
with over $200,000 (in 1989 dollars) in total income jumped from 14.0% in 1995 to 
16.0% in 1996.  Even more strikingly, the share received by those with over $1 million 
jumped from 5.1% to 6.4%, or by more than one quarter. 
Table 2 gives a seven-year perspective on the recent surge in incomes at the top.  
In this table the income figures are based on a concept of modified adjusted income,   29 
which excludes realized capital gains.  It shows that the share of total income received by 
those returns with over $200,00 (1991 dollars) of income increased from 11.47% to 
14.32%, or over one-fourth, between 1994 and 1997.  Even more striking, the share 
received by those with income over $1 million increased from 3.37% to 4.92%, or nearly 
50%!  Some of this increase is certainly due to a larger number of returns in this category, 
but certainly not all. 
The increase between 1994 and 1997 in the share of income received by high-
income taxpayers is of at least the same order of magnitude as the increase between 1985 
and 1988 which convinced nearly all observers, including Slemrod (1996), that, because 
this surge could not be explained by non-tax factors, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 must 
have been a major influence.  It is less convincing to ascribe such a role for the Taxpayer 
Didn't Notice Act of 1995, or any tax change passed in 1994. 
The sources of income growth between 1995 and 1996 are explored in greater 
detail in Table 3 (detailed data on 1997 is not yet publicly available).  Here, taxpayers are 
ranked by Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), which includes capital gains.  In just one year, 
the number of returns with incomes over $1 million increased by 27.5 percent, while AGI 
going to millionaires increased by 38.1 percent. Although in this case, capital gains was 
the fastest-growing source of income (71.2 percent) for this group, there was also 
tremendous one-year growth in all other forms of income, such as a 29.9 percent increase 
in wages and salaries.  By contrast, there was only a 1.6 percent increase in the total 
number of returns for people at all income levels, and a 5.1 percent increase in overall 
AGI.          
Detail on higher slices of the income distribution is not yet available for the U.S. 
for these years, but some fascinating information from state income tax returns is   30 
obtainable.  Table 4 comes from 1995 and 1996 New Jersey income tax returns.  While 
overall growth in New Jersey gross income was 7.6%, it was double-digit for all annual 
income classes over $250,000, and was nearly 50% for those families fortunate enough to 
have over $3 million in gross income!  To be sure, much of the growth in the income of 
the highest class can be traced to the fact that the number of tax returns increased by over 
40%, from 689 to 987, but the increase in the size of this group itself is a remarkable 
phenomenon.
14 
The source of the large gains at the top of the income distribution is also of 
interest.  The total gross income increase of returns over $250,000 was $5.93 billion.  Of 
that, almost none was in the form of interest and dividends.  A total of 46.0% was 
employee compensation, 24.9% was capital gain, 9.5% was in partnership income, and 
11.1% was in S corporation income. 
 
7. Conclusions 
"There's something happenin' here. 
What it is ain't exactly clear." 
 
   Stephen  Stills 
 
 
  Our analysis of Section 6 suggests an extraordinary increase in the income, both 
realized and unrealized, of the already affluent beginning around 1996.  What new light 
does this development shed on the chicken-and-egg ruminations of the first part of this 
essay? 
  First of all, it casts some doubt on the hypothesis that the top tax rate cuts of 1981 
and 1986 were the key factor in generating the increases in measured inequality of the  
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last two decades.  A decade passed between 1986 and 1996, with two top tax rate 
increase episodes in between, so it is difficult to link the recent surge in incomes at the 
top to tax policy.  If the 1996 surge is not tax-related, it makes more plausible the case 
that the surge of 1986, of a similarly large magnitude, was not primarily tax-driven. 
  More importantly, the recent evidence suggests that the increase in inequality that 
began in the 1980's has not abated.  If anything, the rate of increase dramatically 
accelerated in the mid-1990s.  Standard models suggest that the appropriate response to 
this development is an increase in the progressivity of the tax-and-transfer system.  
Models of public choice suggest that this may not happen. 
  In closing we note that during the preparation of this paper there were times in 
1998 when we worried that our analysis of the stock market runup would seem 
anachronistic, or even quaint, by the time of this conference.  As of this writing (in early 
January, 1999), this worry has proven unfounded.  But the uncertainty in the economic 
situation, and in particular the severe recessions in several Asian countries, remind us that 
the demand for progressivity as social insurance has not abated, and may be increasing. Table 1 
The Distribution of Income Under Alternative Definitions of Income 
 
  Mean income (in $thousands)  Share of total income (%) 
  SCF, SCF, SCF,  Treasury  SCF, SCF, SCF, 
 Self-  Income  Income  Family  Self-  Income  Income 
  reported definition definition Economic  reported definition definition 
 income  (1)  (2)  Income  income  (1)  (2) 
          
Income  rank          
          
Top 1 %  627.7  695.3  1013.8  14.3  14.3  14.2  17.8 
95-99
th  %  159.7  196.6  242.5  13.9 14.6 16.0 17.0 
90-94%  93.3  107.3  127.3  10.7 10.7 10.9 11.2 
80-89%  68.2 75.5 83.4  16.0 15.6 15.4 14.7 
          
Top  quintile  120.8  138.7  172.7  54.9 55.2 56.5 60.7 
60-79%  45.4 50.1 53.2  21.5 20.7 20.4 18.7 
40-60%  29.6 31.4 32.7  13.3 13.5 12.8 11.5 
20-39%  17.2  18.6  19.2  7.8 7.9 7.6 6.7 
Bottom  quintile  5.9 6.2 6.4  2.9 2.7 2.5 2.2 
          
Overall  43.8  49.1  56.9  100 100 100 100 
 
Source:  1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, unpublished distributional tables provided 
by the Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis for 1996, and authors' calculations. 
 
N o t e s :          
Households are re-sorted for each income definition.       
         
Income  definitions:         
"Family economic income" is the income concept used by the Treasury Department in 
its distributional tables. It is based on the Haig-Simons definition of income, and 
imputes accrued capital income to tax return and Census data using a variety of data 
sources. 
"Self-reported income" is the response to the SCF question on income, 
which counts income on a realization basis. 
 
(1) Replaces reported capital income with a 6.4% real return to publicly-traded 
corporate equities, and a 3% real return to net worth other than business equity, 
but includes closely-held business income as reported.       
(2) is the same as (1) but assumes a 28% real return to publicly-traded corporate 





 Table 2 
Distribution of Modified Adjusted Gross Income, 1991-1997 
 
    Totals      
Modified  AGI         
($000)  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
        
<0  -61,597 -60,698 -62,524 -63,942 -65,906 -65,446 -49,630 
0-5  40,560 40,444 42,171 44.462 46,898 49,748 50,345 
5-10  114,245 117,865 124,042 125,589 130,826 134,879 140,298 
10-20  373,865 382,839 400,343 418,819 444,590 460,068 478,709 
20-30  442,024 445,290 463,651 481,937 494,658 520,349 551,227 
30-50  815,366 837,520 853,684 886,855 928,310 960,354  1,012,945 
50-75  669,210 686,697 702,786 732,854 757,710 793,323 840,676 
75-100  301,365 314,214 316,007 340,703 365,098 390,341 427,707 
100-200  324,790 341,398 353,776 374,579 420,201 463,083 506,622 
200-300  99,534  102,240 109.707 118,529 129,673 145,659 160,638 
300-500  87,334 100,210 95,461 103,851  118,588  131,768  144,908 
500-1,000  73,656 85,497 80,640 83,565 97,934  111,271  128,571 
Over 1,000 
 
103,138 139,973 121,234 127,086 153,162 183,772 227,327 
       Total  3,383,490  3,533,489  3,600,978  3,774,887  4,021,742  4,279,169  4,620,343 
         








 Table 2 (continued) 
 
    Shares      
Modified  AGI         
($000)  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
         
<0  -1.82% -1.72% -1.74% -1.69% -1.64% -1.53% -1.07% 
0-5  1.20% 1.14% 1.17% 1.18% 1.17% 1.16% 1.09% 
5-10  3.38% 3.34% 3.44% 3.33% 3.25% 3.15% 3.04% 
10-20  11.05% 10.83% 11.12% 11.09% 11.05% 10.75% 10.36% 
20-30  13.06% 12.60% 12.88% 12.77% 12.30% 12.16% 11.93% 
30-50  24.10% 23.70% 23.71% 23.49% 23.08% 22.44% 21.92% 
50-75  19.78% 19.43% 19.52% 19.41% 18.84% 18.54% 18.20% 
75-100  8.91% 8.89% 8.78% 9.03% 9.08% 9.12% 9.26% 
100-200  9.60% 9.66% 9.82% 9.92%  10.45%  10.82%  10.97% 
200-300  2.94% 2.89% 3.05% 3.14% 3.22% 3.40% 3.48% 
300-500  2.58% 2.84% 2.65% 2.75% 2.95% 3.08% 3.14% 
500-1,000  2.18% 2.42% 2.24% 2.21% 2.44% 2.60% 2.78% 
Over 1,000 
 
3.05% 3.96% 3.37% 3.37% 3.81% 4.29% 4.92% 
      Total  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00% 
         
Over  200  10.75% 12.11% 11.30% 11.47% 12.42% 13.38% 14.32% 
 
Source:  Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury Department.  We are grateful to Bob Carroll for providing us with this information. 
 
Notes: 
  Income classifier is Modified AGI in 1991 dollars.  All totals are expressed in nominal dollars (in $millions). 
  Modified AGI defined as AGI minus capital gains in AGI and Social Security in AGI, plus tax-exempt interest income. 
 
  Data for 1997 are preliminary, and are particularly subject to error at the bottom (modified AGI<0) and the top of the income distribution. Table 3 
Changes in Adjusted Gross Income and Income Sources, by Income Group, U.S., 1995-6 
(in $ billions, except for number of returns column) 
 
Size of Adjusted 
Gross Income 
($000) 









Capital Gains  Partnership 
and S-Corp. 
Income 
         
Under  $200  1995 116,954,819  3,549.30 2,896.05  213.29  64.79  24.53 
  1996 118,827,802  3,729.36 3,009.93  221.13  81.52  26.37 
  %  Growth  1.6 5.1 3.9 3.7  25.8  7.5 
$200 - 500  1995  1,007,136  292.12  174.56  31.75  24.93  32.18 
  1996  1,198,671  347.40  204.71  35.97 35.72 36.66 
  %  Growth  19.0 18.9 17.3 13.3 43.3 13.9 
$500  -  1,000 1995  178,374  120.35  60.21 15.99 15.99 20.34 
  1996  213,823  144.81  70.48 17.78 23.78 23.79 
  %  Growth  19.9 20.3 17.1 11.2 48.7 17.0 
More  than  $1,000  1995 86,998  227.58  70.64 36.86 64.71 48.70 
  1996 110,912  314.40 91.75  43.26 110.80 59.96 
  %  Growth  27.5 38.1 29.9 17.4 71.2 23.1 
Total  1995 118,218,327  4,189.35 3,201.46  297.89  170.42  125.75 
  1996 120,351,208  4,535.97 3,376.87  318.14  251.82  146.78 
  %  Growth  1.8 8.3 5.5 6.8  47.8  16.7 
 
Source:  IRS Statistics of Income Bulletin, Fall 1998, and Individual Income Tax Returns 1995. 
Interest and dividends includes both taxable interest, taxable dividends, and tax-exempt interest.  Capital gains is defined here as 
taxable net gain less taxable net loss on Schedule D, plus capital gain distributions reported on Form 1040.  Partnership and S-
Corporation income is net income less net loss. 
 Table 4 
Changes in Gross Income and Income Sources, by Income Group in New Jersey, 1995-6 
(in $ billions, except for number of returns column) 
 
Size of Gross 
Income 
($000) 













          
Under  $250 1995  3,326,133  130.38  109.21  6.663 2.230 1.075 0.623 
  1996  3,337,510  136.36  113.37  6.812 2.895 1.103 0.765 
  %  Growth  0.3 4.6 3.8 2.2  29.8  2.6  12.3 
$250  -  500  1995 31,260  10.54  6.92  0.651 0.634 0.657 0.355 
  1996 36,085  12.17  7.91  0.703 0.894 0.716 0.434 
  %  Growth  15.4  15.5  14.3 8.0 41.0 9.0 22.2 
$500  -  1,000 1995 9,737  6.55  3.88  0.488 0.569 0.479 0.446 
  1996 11,083 7.45  4.37  0.497 0.780 0.556 0.486 
  %  Growth  13.8 13.7 12.6  1.8  37.0 16.1  9.0 
$1,000-3,000 1995 3,615  5.58  2.81  0.503 0.765 0.370 0.693 
  1996 4,394  6.74  3.32  0.514 1.087 0.485 0.827 
  %  Growth  21.5 20.8 18.1  2.2  42.1 31.1 19.3 
More  than  $3,000  1995  689  4.50  1.30  0.505 1.112 0.349 1.013 
  1996  987  6.74  2.04  0.504 1.794 0.660 1.348 
  %  Growth  43.3 49.8 56.9 -0.2 61.3 89.1 33.1 
Total  1995  3,371,434  157.55  124.12  8.81 5.31 2.93 3.13 
  1996  3,390,059  169.46  131.01  9.03 7.45 3.52 3.86 
  %  Growth  0.6 7.6 5.6 2.5  40.3  20.1  23.3 
 




Equity and Net Worth of Households, Ranked by Alternative Definitions of Income 
 
  Mean equities (in thousands)  Net worth (in thousands)  Equities as a share of net worth 
           
  Self- Income  Income Self- Income  Income  Self- Income  Income 
 reported definition  definition reported definition definition  reported definition definition 
  income (1)  (2) income (1)  (2)  income (1)  (2) 
            
I n c o m e   r a n k              
            
Top  1  %  992.9 1273.0 1569.2 5078.2 5430.4  5581.9  0.196  0.234  0.281 
95-99th  %  204.3 214.2 230.3  1021.2  1146.6 1200.7 0.200 0.187  0.192 
90-94%  85.0  91.0  79.3 452.5 504.4  573.3 0.188 0.180  0.138 
80-89%  53.4  39.4  33.8 297.7 266.6  248.8 0.179 0.148  0.136 
            
Top  quintile  138.5 148.9 161.3 720.1 760.3  787.0 0.192 0.196  0.205 
Next  highest  quintile  22.8  19.4  13.5 173.4 151.4  142.0 0.131 0.128  0.095 
Middle  quintile  9.8  8.2  4.3 105.9 104.0  95.2 0.093 0.079  0.045 
Next lowest quintile  8.8  3.7  1.7  83.6  77.7  70.9  0.105  0.048  0.025 
Bottom  quintile  1.7 0.9 0.3  51.3  39.2 37.8  0.034  0.023  0.009 
            
Overall  36.3  36.3  36.3 227.0 227.0  227.0 0.160 0.160  0.160 
 
Source:  Survey of Consumer Finances, 1995, and authors' calculations discussed in text. 
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